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i n 
In accordance with Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, the State Appellees respectfully petition the Court to 
grant a rehearing and to reconsider its decision in this case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court reversed the trial court's granting of our motion 
to dismiss, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
the Court's opinion of April 12, 1990. We respectfully submit 
that the Court's decision arguably: 
(1) inverts the burden of proof; 
(2) substantially merges tort and "takings" jurisprudence; 
practically abolishes sovereign immunity for most tort claims; 
and disallows dispositive motions against "takings" claims; 
(3) unreasonably burdens governmental response to emergen-
cies; and 
(4) largely disestablishes the State's public-trust author-
ity, and reduces the Public Trust Doctrine to a nuisance concept. 
In addition, the Court's opinion does not address Colman's 
Fifth Amendment claim, which claim we think the trial court 
should not consider. (We reassert the authorities presented in 
the State's briefs.) We respectfully request the Court's advice. 
We think the trial court should be affirmed as a matter of 
law, and we respectfully request the Court's reconsideration. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
1. BURDEN OF PROOF 
The Court's opinion arguably inverts the burden of proof. 
We respectfully request clarification. 
At page 5 of the slip opinion, the Court states: "Colman 
can only recover for the taking of property to the extent that 
property exists and to the extent he has legal rights in that 
property." We agree. However, the opinion's immediately preced-
ing sentence arguably suggests the burden of proof is on the 
State: "Colman cannot recover if the State proves that in fact 
there was no canal or that Colman had no legal rights in the 
canal." Id. (emphasis added). 
We wonder if the Court really intended to reverse the burden 
of proof. "The rule placing the burden upon the landowner has 
come down to us from early times in this jurisdiction." State 
Road Commission v. Taqcrart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167, 170 
(1967); also see State v. Howes, 20 Utah 2d 246, 436 P.2d 803, 
804 (1968); and Utah State Road Commfn v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 
832 (Utah 1984). It is the property owner's burden to prove a 
"taking" by at least a preponderance of the evidence.1 
1
 In Taggart, supra, this Court affirmed jury instructions 
that imposed on the landowner "the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the value of the land taken." 43 0 
P.2d at 170. If the Court had needed to direct the trial court 
on remand, perhaps the Court would have directed that a higher 
(continued...) 
2 
1(...continued) 
burden be imposed on the property owner. (No remand was neces-
sary because the Court affirmed, concluding that nthe jury was 
not misdirected by the court's instructions." Id.) Other 
jurisdictions impose substantially higher burdens on the property 
owner. 
We give the following cases as examples (all emphasis 
added): Matter of Egg Harbor Assoc, 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115, 
1123 (N.J. 1983) ("The burden of demonstrating that a taking has 
occurred lies upon the party alleging that the state action is 
unconstitutional. Proof must be by clear and convincing evi-
dence."); De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66, 496 N.E.2d 879, 
885 (N.Y. 1986) ("A landowner who claims that land regulation has 
effected a taking of his property bears the heavy burden of over-
coming the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to the 
regulation and of proving every element of his claim beyond a 
reasonable doubt. [Citations.] That burden remains upon him 
throughout the case and never shifts to the State."); Common-
wealth Dept. of Transportation v. Kemp, 515 A.2d 68, 71 
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1986) ("In order for a condemnee to prove that a de 
facto taking has occurred, he must show exceptional circumstances 
which have substantially deprived him of the use and enjoyment of 
his property. * * * [A]nd that the damages sustained by the 
condemnee were the immediate, necessary and unavoidable conse-
quence of that exercise."); Estate of Scott v. Victoria County, 
778 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tex.App. 1989) ("extraordinary burden"); 
McCracken v. City of Philadelphia, 451 A.2d 1046, 1048 
(Pa.Cmwlth. 1982) ("Where a de facto taking is alleged, the 
property owner bears a heavy burden of proof. [Citation.] He 
must show * * * exceptional circumstances * * * . " ) . 
Other cases holding that the property owner has the burden 
of proof include: Ario v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 367 
N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1985); Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 
P.2d 717, 731 (Wyo. 1985) ("The plaintiff has the burden of 
establishing these [takings] claims. If he fails to do it, the 
court will not presume the impact."); City of Sierra Vista v. 
Cochise Enterprises, 144 Ariz. 375, 697 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Ariz. 
App. 1984); Mabe v. State, 385 P.2d 401, 406 (Idaho 1963); 
Anderson v. County of Santa Cruz, 344 P.2d 421, 425 (Cal.App. 
1959) ("the plaintiff must show not only a taking or damaging for 
a public use but also that it is actionable under the general 
(continued...) 
3 
The just-cited Utah cases involved "straight" condemnation 
(i.e., the State initiated formal legal action to condemn proper-
ty) . Even in straight condemnation cases, the property owner has 
the burden of proof with respect to the existence and value of 
his property. And that is all the more necessary when (as here) 
the property owner is the plaintiff. lf[T]he rule followed by 
most of the authorities putting the burden of proving his right 
to compensation or damages on the landowner has been held to be 
particularly applicable in cases of inverse condemnation." 2 7 
AmJur2d, Eminent Domain, sec. 505, p. 461 (emphasis added). 
Having alleged inverse condemnation, Colman (not the State) 
has the burden of proof. And his first burden, of course, is to 
prove his alleged "property" existed. 
We respectfully ask the Court to consider modifying its 
opinion to emphasize that Colman has the affirmative burden of 
proving a taking of his property. 
1(...continued) 
law."); Price v. City of Junction, 711 F.2d 582, 591 (5th Cir. 
1983); Foster v. United States, 2 Cl.Ct. 426, 445 (1983) ("The 
burden of establishing the value of the property taken rests upon 
the claimant. As a general rule, there is no compensation for 
frustrated contracts or for loss of future income. The sovereign 
must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities the owner 
loses."). 
4 
2. "DAMAGE" AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
We fear the Court's discussion of "damaged11 (Article I, 
Section 22, Utah Constitution) will have these effects: (a) 
those with property-related tort claims against governmental 
entities will plead their claims as "takings" because (b) "tak-
ings" claims automatically defeat sovereign immunity; and (c) all 
of that will impair government and disserve the public interest. 
For the reasons given in our briefs, we respectfully ask the 
Court to reconsider its decision and opinion, and to affirm the 
trial court's judgment that there was no taking here and that the 
State has sovereign immunity. Otherwise, we ask the Court to 
modify its opinion, to emphasize that torts cannot succeed as 
"takings" claims, and to preserve immunity against tort claims. 
a. 
We fear that almost any damage to "property" will be pled as 
a taking (and it will require little imagination to characterize 
most torts as invading or violating some "property" interest). 
The Utah Constitution will indeed have become an unfortunate 
"font of tort law." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
We do not think the Court intends that effect, and we 
respectfully request appropriate limiting language. 
5 
b. 
We also think the Court's opinion may practically abolish 
sovereign immunity for tort claims. The Court has held that 
government has no immunity against inverse condemnation claims; 
and we fear that, by careful pleading, future litigants might 
succeed in transforming most torts into takings—leaving govern-
mental entities without immunity as a matter of constitutional 
law. The Legislature then would have little or no right to 
provide for governmental immunity; only a constitutional amend-
ment could reinstate immunity against tort claims (i.e., against 
tort claims pled as takings). 
We respectfully ask the Court to include in its opinion 
clarifying language that would preclude such possibilities. 
c. 
We submit that, whether intended or not, the arguable merger 
of "takings" and tort jurisprudence and the accompanying loss of 
sovereign immunity will harm the public interest. 
Governmental entities (the State, counties, towns, and 
special districts) may become less willing to act, and may avoid 
addressing emergencies. They might fear that whatever they do 
will lead to their being sued for a "taking." 
And once they are sued, it seems they may be penalized yet 
again. The costs of trial can be devastating (especially to 
6 
local governments and special districts); but they may not be 
able to avoid trial, for lower courts might surmise from the 
Courtfs opinion that dispositive motions on the pleadings should 
not be granted against inverse condemnation claims. As a practi-
cal matter, in terms of intimidation and financial costs and lost 
time and resources, governmental entities may "lose" even when 
they ultimately win at trial. 
We think all claims—including "takings" claims—should be 
dismissed when they cannot be sustained as a matter of law. 
"Takings" are easily alleged; but, no matter how nicely pled, 
insubstantial allegations should not command a trial. 
We submit that, by including additional limitations and 
clarification in its opinion, this Court can obviate much un-
necessary litigation on these issues. 
3. EMERGENCIES 
Floodwaters created an emergency all around the lake, and 
breaching the causeway mitigated that emergency. The lav; long 
has insulated government from claims arising from emergency 
action, and we think the Court has reaffirmed that established 
principle here. Nevertheless, we respectfully ask the Court to 
clarify its opinion on certain points that might be confusing to 
lower courts. 
7 
a. 
The Court directs the trial court to apply the "emergency" 
rule if the governmental action was necessary. Slip op. 11. We 
agree the emergency rule applies only in cases of necessity.2 
However, while recognizing that government is not liable in cases 
of necessary emergency-response (slip op. 9-11), the Court 
incongruously directs the trial court to "determine whether 
Colman's canal would have been in danger without the breach." 
Id. at 9. We have several concerns about that. 
We think it irrelevant to consider whether the canal was in 
danger. When faced with an emergency, government should not be 
required to stop and deliberate over whether it can act to remedy 
the emergency or whether it must not act until it has determined 
that the emergency itself will damage particular property. 
Imposing such a burden could stymie the response, exacerbate the 
emergency, and enlarge the destruction. 
Moreover, this concept (that the emergency rule applies 
only if Colman's ditch inevitably would be destroyed anyway) has 
z
 Breaching the causeway was necessary to counteract the 
flood emergency. In the Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (H.B. 30, 
1984 Budget Session), the Legislature made specific findings 
about the "extraordinary flooding conditions" and the need for 
the breach. Those legislative findings demonstrate an emergency 
and are conclusive on the question of "necessity.fl Idaho State 
AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Idaho 1986). The emergen-
cy rule clearly applies and, we submit, this Court can and should 
affirm the trial court as a matter of law. 
8 
no apparent precedent. The Court's cited cases hold in favor of 
the government; because they involved emergency-response, as a 
matter of law the government's actions did not constitute a 
compensable taking. Those cases hardly afford an exception in 
Colman's favor.3 
And, simply, the Court's directive (to determine whether the 
ditch was in danger even without the breach) does not jibe with 
the Court's conclusion that the emergency rule applies in cases 
of "necessity." Breaching the causeway was necessary, and that 
3
. The Court (slip op. 9) cites United States v. Caltex, 344 
U.S. 149 (1952), and Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 
(1924). Each case held there was no compensable taking and 
neither case purported to base its holding on the proposition 
that the emergency alone would have destroyed the property. 
Indeed, Caltex clearly did not rely on that distinction. Caltex 
was decided expressly on the basis of U.S. v. Pacific R. Co., 120 
U.S. 227 (1887), which "involved bridges which had been destroyed 
during the * * * [Civil War] by a retreating Northern Army to 
impede the advance of the Confederate Army." 344 U.S. at 153, 
154. The bridge was destroyed—and there was no "taking" as a 
matter of law—irrespective of whether the bridge (the property 
claimed to have been taken) was itself in danger by virtue of the 
advancing army. Indeed, the emergency (the advancing army) would 
not have destroyed the bridge; so this case clearly undercuts 
Colman's argument. Simply, as Caltex notes, government can, 
"with immunity," destroy property as necessary to meet an emer-
gency. 344 U.S. at 154. 
And while the land in Sanguinetti would have been flooded 
even if the government had not built the canal, that clearly 
played no role in the Supreme Court's decision. It found no 
taking irrespective of that fact. Besides, Sanguinetti is 
otherwise inapposite to Colman's argument for an exception to the 
emergency rule, because it is not an emergency case (the govern-
ment was not responding to an emergency). Neither Caltex nor 
Sanguinetti affords the distinction Colman asserts against the 
"emergency" rule. 
9 
fact is separate and unrelated to the question of whether the 
floodwaters would have damaged Colman's ditch. 
The emergency rule is vital, but will be quite empty if it 
applies only to property that will be destroyed by the emergency 
in any event. For this and the foregoing reasons, we ask the 
Court to disavow this "distinction11 briefly discussed in the slip 
opinion at 9. 
b. 
We submit the Court has misapplied Miller v. Schoene and 
Teresi v. State. Slip op. 9. Those cases clearly support the 
principle that the State cannot be liable for emergency actions. 
Though the Court supports the emergency rule with other authori-
ties, the Court's opinion does not relate those two cases to the 
emergency rule "because they involve questions of proper regula-
tion and the use of the police power" and because "[t]hese cases 
do not involve a direct physical taking, as is alleged in this 
case." Id. We respectfully disagree and ask the Court to recon-
sider. 
We agree those two cases involved an exercise of police 
power, but that is no distinction. Our breaching of the causeway 
also was the work of police power. Indeed, every governmental 
emergency-action will be an exercise of police power. 
10 
And, contrary to the Court's discussion, we respectfully 
suggest that those cases more clearly involved "a direct physical 
taking" than does the instant case. In Miller, the state de-
stroyed "a large number of ornamental red cedar trees growing on 
[the plaintiff's] property." 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928). In 
Teresi, "the state ordered that the [plaintiff!s crop of] peppers 
be fumigated * * *, which caused them to rot within 10 days." 
180 Cal.App.3d 239, 225 Cal.Rptr. 517, 518 (1986). 
Colmanfs claim of physical interference is no stronger than 
the utter destruction that occurred in Miller and Teresi. And in 
each of those cases the state was not liable because it was 
responding to an emergency. Teresi, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 519. 
Colman's claim should likewise fail as a matter of law. 
In sum, we believe Miller and Teresi fully support the 
emergency rule and defeat Colman!s claim; and we respectfully ask 
the Court to reconsider its opinion in that regard. 
4. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Respectfully, we believe the Court has misapprehended the 
Public Trust Doctrine and Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 
146 U.S. 387 (1892). The Court also has misunderstood the 
State's position. 
After briefly discussing the Public Trust Doctrine, the 
Court states: 
11 
This case, however, presents a different problem. 
The State has already exercised its powers under the 
public trust in leasing the canal on the bed of the 
lake to Colman. Now, the State wishes to revoke that 
grant without compensation to Colman. The State 
maintains that it can do so since it holds the waters 
of the lake under the public trust. In taking such a 
position, the State essentially argues that it origi-
nally acted without authority in granting the lease to 
Colman. 
Slip opinion at 21 (emphasis added). 
a. 
We respectfully disagree. First, the State has not argued 
that it originally acted without authority in granting the lease 
to Colman. Nor have we sought to revoke the lease. Rather, as 
we stated in our primary brief (at 38 n.21): "We have never said 
he cannot have his ditch, but only that his ditch cannot super-
sede the Statefs public-trust action." 
That is still our position. The State clearly had authority 
to issue Colmanfs lease and to make other provisions on the lake 
in the public interest. The State had authority to grant South-
ern Pacific an easement for the causeway, and when floodwaters 
grossly enlarged the lake, the State had authority to mitigate 
damage by helping breach the causeway. The parties might dis-
agree about the effect of the breach, but neither Colman nor the 
State has doubted the Statefs authority to issue the lease. We 
think the Court has fundamentally misunderstood the State!s 
12 
position and has otherwise based its decision on misapprehended 
considerations, also including those discussed below. 
b. 
The Court's above-quoted paragraph arguably implies that 
once the State exercises its public-trust authority, it is not 
free to take later action that might conflict with the first 
action. That, we respectfully submit, is neither the law nor 
good policy. 
Specifically, the Court's opinion seems to assume that if 
the first public-trust action (leasing to Colman) and the later 
public-trust action (breaching the causeway) somehow conflict, 
then one of those actions must be deemed unauthorized (or the 
lease must be deemed "revoked"). Slip opinion at 21. 
Such a view, we fear, would disestablish ongoing public-
trust authority. The first interest granted in the lake or 
lakebed would thereafter give that grantee (or lessee) power to 
control the lake. It would effectively "freeze" the State from 
taking any further action if the grantee might object to it. 
(This would be contrary not only to the Public Trust Doctrine, 
but also to the "Salt Cases" discussed in our briefs. See Brief 
of State Respondents 36-39; and State Respondents1 Supplemental 
Brief 43, 44, 62. ) 
13 
c. 
We submit the Court's decision also misapprehends Illinois 
Central, in which the Supreme Court stated: "The question * * * 
to be considered is * * * whether the railroad corporation can 
hold the [submerged] lands and control the waters by the grant, 
against any future exercise of power over them by the State. If 
146 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). The Court held no. 
Without doubt, the State may issue a lease like Colman's, 
at least when it can be done "without detriment to the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining." Slip opinion at 22, 
quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456. But the point is: 
the lease cannot prevail "against any future exercise of power 
over [the lake] by the State." 14 6 U.S. at 4 52. We submit this 
Court has misunderstood that central point and has misapplied 
Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine. 
Illinois Central held that the 1873 state legislature was 
free to repeal the grant made to the railroad by the 1869 legis-
lative act. 146 U.S. at 460. "[R]epealing the same is valid and 
effective * * * [to] restor[e] to the State the same control, 
dominion and ownership of [the submerged] lands that it had prior 
to the [1869] act * * *." 146 U.S. at 463-64. 
In our case, the Legislature specifically "declare[d] it [to 
be] in the public interest and a public purpose to breach the 
causeway." Great Salt Lake Causeway Act, sec. 1 (H.B. 30, 1984 
14 
Budget Session). Breaching the causeway was necessary and 
proper. And because the State had public-trust authority to 
exercise "the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands 
[including Colman's lakebed ditch] that it had prior to" issuance 
of the lease, 146 U.S. at 464, Colman can state no claim as a 
matter of law. 
d. 
It is Colman's lease, not the State's public-trust inter-
ests, that must yield under Illinois Central and the other cases 
cited in our briefs. Colman has his lease, but it cannot over-
ride the public trust. As Illinois Central shows, Colman would 
have no cause of action if the State had revoked the lease, and 
he certainly has no claim against the State in this case. 
e. 
The Court states that "there is nothing to show that Col-
man's canal impaired the public interest in any way at the time 
the State granted him the right to conduct his operation." Slip 
op. at 22. We respectfully submit that, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, as a matter of law it is irrelevant whether the 
canal ever impaired the public interest. That is not an issue. 
We fear the Court's opinion reduces the Public Trust Doc-
trine to a nuisance-abatement doctrine, at most. The Court 
apparently would deny the State's public-trust authority simply 
15 
upon a finding that Colmanfs ditch was not a nuisance. But the 
Public Trust Doctrine concerns far more than nuisances. If the 
State could exercise public-trust authority only to abate nuisan-
ces, there would be no distinct public-trust authority. (The 
State can abate nuisances without public-trust authority.) We 
urge the Court not to diminish or disestablish the public trust.4 
f. 
Colman located on the bed of the Great Salt Lake subject to 
public-trust authority. When the State exercised that authority 
to mitigate flooding, as a matter of law the State did so without 
liability to Colman. 
We respectfully ask the Court to consider whether it has 
misapplied Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine. We 
4
 The excerpt from Illinois Central (slip op. 22) does not 
address our case. That excerpt notes merely that sovereign 
lands cannot be alienated except when it can be done without 
detriment to the public interest. 
From that, this Court apparently would dispose of the 
public-trust issue by simply asking the trial court to determine 
whether Colman!s ditch impaired the public interest at the time 
the lease was granted. (Slip op. 22.) However, that addresses a 
non-issue, for no one has ever argued that the ditch was a 
detriment at that time. And such a consideration would be 
irrelevant, anyv/ay, for public-trust authority does not depend on 
whether or not the ditch impaired any public interest. 
We respectfully ask the Court not to dispose of this impor-
tant matter on the basis of an immaterial point. 
16 
submit that the trial court correctly dismissed Colman's claim 
as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision represents a substantial change in the 
law, and there is reason to reconsider this case on the State's 
Petition For Rehearing. The State's Petition should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this May /Q , 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RV-0OUGLASy CREDILLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE APPELLEES 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
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STEWART, Justice: 
William J. Colman filed an action against the Utah 
State Land Board and against Ralph Miles, Director of the Utah 
Division of State Lands-and-Forestry-of the Department o£ 
Natural Resources—(-referr^ d~-to~coll^ ct-i-vely--^ s—"the-~State!L)-, 
and against Southern Pacific Transportation Company for the 
destruction of an underwater brine canal Colman maintained on 
the bed of the Great Salt Lake, The trial court dismissed the 
complaint, and Colman appealed. 
I• FACTS 
This case arose out of the breach of the Great Salt 
Lake causeway on August 1, 1984, The causeway is a raised bed 
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of fill which crosses the lake in an east-west direction. 
Southern Pacific runs a railroad line over the causeway. The 
causeway was constructed in 1959 by Southern Pacific after 
obtaining a right-of-way for its construction from the state of 
Utah. 
The Great Salt Lake Causeway Act (the "Act"), 1984 
Utah Laws ch. 32, enacted during the 1984 budget session of the 
Utah legislature, authorized breaching the causeway as a 
response to the rapid rise of the water level in the lake. 
During this same session, the legislature amended the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act to limit the liability of 
governmental entities for management of flood waters. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3; 1984 Utah Laws ch. 33, § 1. 
Prior to the breach of the causeway by the State and 
Southern Pacific, Colman operated and maintained a five-mile-
long underwater brine canal running parallel to and 
approximately 1,300 feet north of the causeway. The canal was 
authorized by a lease and easement granted by the State. The 
brine canal was used in Colman's business of extracting 
minerals from deep lake brines. 
On July 20, 1984, Colman filed a complaint in the 
Third District Court seeking (1) to enjoin the State and 
Southern Pacific from breaching the causeway, and (2) to 
recover monetary damages for the damage the breach would cause 
his property if the court did not grant the injunction. 
Colman's mineral extraction operation was located on 
the western shore of the lake. The canal began near that point 
and ran five miles eastward into the lake. Colman alleged that 
for his mineral extraction operation to be economically 
feasible, it was necessary for him to draw brines from the 
deeper strata of the lake, where the brines are more dense. 
His complaint alleged that he had dredged and maintained the 
canal so that its bottom^was at_a__const.ant_elevation. Colman 
alleged that the canal made it possible for him to pump the 
deep-water brines into his mineral extraction operation. 
Colman alleged that the breach of the causeway would 
cause water from the south arm of the lake to flow through the 
breach under great pressure and cut through the canal banks. 
He also claimed that the breach would create turbidity and 
sedimentation, making__the_use„ of the^canal as_a _brine_condu.it 
impossible. 
The trial court denied Colman*s motion for a 
preliminary injunction on July 31, 1984, after an evidentiary 
hearing, and the causeway was breached the following day. On 
August 20, 1984, the State filed a motion to dismiss Colman*s 
damage claims. That motion was granted by the trial court 
May 2, 1986. The trial court concluded that (1) the Utah 
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Governmental Immunity Act immunized the State from liability, 
(2) the breach of the causeway was a valid exercise of the 
police powers of the State, (3) the breach of the causeway was 
in furtherance of the State's public trust responsibilities, 
and (4) there was no compensable taking of a property 
interest. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted 
by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of its claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. 
Athasr 121 Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952)- The courts 
are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any 
doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of 
a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of 
giving the party an opportunity to present its proof. Baur v. 
Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283, 284, 383 P.2d 397, 397 
(1963). On this appeal, we look solely to the material 
allegations of Colman's complaint, not to the evidence 
presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. In their 
briefs and at oral argument, the State and Southern Pacific 
rely extensively on the evidence presented at the preliminary 
injunction hearing to support their position. We do not, 
however, consider this evidence on this appeal. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(b). Coiman's complaint was dismissed on a rule 12 
motion to dismiss. When reviewing a dismissal based on 
rule 12, an appellate court must accept the material 
allegations of the complaint as true, Petersen v. Jones, 16 
Utah 2d 121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (1964), and the trial 
court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears 
that Colman can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. 
Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 
936 (Utah 1988); Freeaard v. First Western Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 
614, 616 (Utah 1987); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 590 
P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). 
The State argues in its supplemental brief that 
*[t]here is no virtue in rigid adherence to a technical rule 
that has no practical bearing on the proper outcome of a 
particular case." We decline to follow the State's suggestion 
that we should ignore the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
"technical rule" the State refers to is found in rule 12(b), 
which provides that"a motion to dismiss'for failure-to state a 
claim upon which "relief can "be "granted" shall" be_tTeBted~as~"a 
motion for summary judgment under rule 56 if matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court. 
However, the rule provides that if a motion to dismiss is 
converted to a motion for summary judgment, it must only be 
done so as to not create procedural prejudice to one of the 
parties. The rule states, "[A]11 parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
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to such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This 
rule gives the opposing party an opportunity to gather evidence 
to rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule, one party 
could have the benefit of significant, supporting evidence 
while the other party would be left to rely solely on the 
unsubstantiated pleadings. 
This rule has much "practical bearing on the proper 
outcome" of this case. The State and Southern Pacific moved 
for dismissal based on Colman's failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. Colman responded to these 
motions with a memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss, 
which focused exclusively on points of law. Colman appears to 
have assumed at that point that the rule 12 standard would be 
followed. His memorandum began by stating, "For purposes of a 
motion to dismiss, the truth of the Complaint's fact 
allegations must be assumed." Colman was not given reasonable 
opportunity to present additional evidence pursuant to 
rule 12(b). Had Colman known that the State would rely on the 
preliminary injunction evidence, he could have submitted other 
evidence to the trial court rebutting that evidemce. 
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion^to 
dismiss only under rule 12 and not under rule 56. The trial 
court did not make any factual findings in denying Colman's 
motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court 
specifically stated that it only ruled that plaintiff had not 
met his burden of proof for a preliminary injunction and that 
its ruling was not dispositive of any other issues. The trial 
court also refused to order Colman to order the transcript of 
the preliminary injunction proceedings for this appeal. In 
granting the State's motion to dismiss, the trial court only 
entered conclusions of law. 
Finally, if a trial court cannot on its own motion 
convert a rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment, Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 2 5 Utah 2d 121, 
123, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970), then certainly we should not 
allow the moving party to do so on appeal. 
III. TAKING OR DAMAGING PROPERTY 
A. Was Colman's canal "property" for purposes of article I, 
gectiQn 22? 
Article I, section" 22~ofTthe Utah Constitution 
provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." A claimant must possess 
some protectible interest in property before that interest is 
entitled to recover under this provision. Colman alleged that 
the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry granted him, as 
part of a lease with the state, an easement for the maintenance 
and operation of the canal. It has always been accepted in 
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this state that even an implied easement is a property interest 
protectible under article I, section 22. Utah State Road 
Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974); Hampton v. 
State ex rel. Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 345, 445 P.2d 708, 
710 (1968); Doolv Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 
31, 37, 33 P. 229, 231-32 (1893). An express easement, such as 
that alleged by Colman, is also "private property" for the 
purposes of article I, section 22. See Whiterocks Irrigation 
Co. v. Mooseman, 45 Utah 79, 79-80, 141 P. 459, 460 (1914); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(2) (Supp. 1989). Nichols on Eminent 
Domain states, "An easement is an interest in land, and it is 
taken in the constitutional sense when the land over which it 
is exercised is taken; but if it is only destroyed and ended, a 
destruction for public purposes may also be an appropriation 
for the same purpose." 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.14, at 
5-186 (3d ed. 1989) (citing United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 
333, 339 (1910)). 
A lessee holding under a valid lease also has a 
property interest protected by the takings clause of the 
constitutional provisions: 
It has been judicially established that 
lessees for years or from year to year, 
holding under a valid devise, grant, or 
lease, have such an interest in property as 
to be classed as "owners" in the 
constitutional sense, and to be entitled to 
compensation for the taking of their 
interest . . . . 
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 5.06, at 5-97 to 101 (3d ed. 
1989). 
We conclude that Colman has alleged a property 
interest protectible under article I, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. We emphasize again that we regard the 
allegations of the complaint as true. We do not look to 
evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. 
Colman cannot recover if the State proves that in fact there 
was no canal or that Colman had no legal rights in the canal. 
Colman can only recover for the taking of property to the 
extent that property exists and to the extent he has legal 
rights in that property. 
B. Was Colman's canal "taken or damaged" for purposes of 
article I, section 22? 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." This Court has 
previously outlined what constitutes a taking and what 
constitutes damage under this constitutional provision. 
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In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 
(1937), the Court stated that a -taking- is -any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially 
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." 
94 Utah at 394, 78 P.2d at 506 (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande 
Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904)); see 
Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d 
708, 711-12 (1968). This Court has also defined the term 
-damage- for the purpose of article I, section 22 and for the 
purpose of the eminent domain statute in Board of Education of 
Logan Citv School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d 
697 (1962). In that case, the Court cited article I, 
section 22 and stated: 
Damages to land, by the construction of a 
public or industrial improvement, though no 
part thereof is taken as provided for under 
78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for 
severance damages, is limited to injuries 
that would be actionable at common law, or 
where there has been some physical 
disturbance of a right, either public or 
private, which the owner enjoys in 
connection with his property and which gives 
it additional value, and which causes him to 
sustain a special damage with respect to his 
property in excess of that sustained by the 
public generally. 
13 Utah 2d at 313-14, 373 P.2d at 699; ££e State ex rel. Road 
Comm'n v. Williams. 22 Utah 2d 331, 334, 452 P.2d 881, 883-84 
(19 69); Twenty-Second Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Dav Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 36 Utah 238, 247, 
103 P. 243, 246 (1909) ("[Tjo bring the case within the damage 
clause of the Constltuti on.,,, -there must-±>e ,some. physical 
interference with the property itself or with some easement 
which constitutes an appurtenant thereto.-). The Court went on 
to explain that such "damage- requires a "definite physical 
injury cognizable to the senses with a perceptible effect on 
the present market value." Croft, 13 Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d 
at 699. The Court listed various types of injuries that would 
be compensable as "damage" under the constitutional provision. 
These included "drying up wells^ and sjprings," "destroying 
lateral supports," "preventing surface waters from running off 
adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands," 
or "depositing of cinders and other foreign materials on 
neighboring lands by the permanent operation of the business or 
improvement established on the adjoining lands." Croft, 13 
Utah 2d at 314, 373 P.2d at 699-700. 
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In our recent case of Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), we 
stated: "Plaintiffs alleged that damages [from the flooding] 
resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence and not a 
permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring interference 
with property rights usually associated with and requisite in a 
compensable taking." 784 P.2d at 465 (citing Sanguinetti v. 
United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924); Accardi v. United 
States, 220 Ct. CI. 347, 356-57, 599 F.2d 423, 429 (1979); 
Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash. 2d 307, 334, 678 P.2d 803, 
818 (1984)). See also koretto v, Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982). 
Colman alleged in his complaint that the breach would 
result in the total destruction of at least a 300-foot segment 
of the canal. He also alleged that the breach would create 
such turbidity in the area of the canal that the remaining 
portions of the canal would be filled with sediment over much 
of its course. Colman alleged that the breach would require 
that he move the canal and pumps to another location free from 
the current caused by the breach. We conclude that Colman has 
alleged a permanent or recurring interference with property 
rights. Thus, Colman has alleged sufficient facts to 
constitute a "taking" or "damage" under article I, section 22. 
C. Was Colman's property "taken or damaged" or merely 
regulated under the State's general police powers? 
The State suggests that because the breach of the 
causeway was a valid exercise of the State's police powers, it 
is not liable for the damage caused to Colman. However, in 
Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), 
we plainly stated, "The constitutional guarantee of just 
compensation for the taking or damaging of private property for 
public use is in no way affected by the fact that the 
expropriator . . . exercis[ed] the police power." 526 P.2d at 
928. 
The State seems to have misled itself on this point by 
relying on isolated language from discussions of a related but 
different issue. It is true that the courts will not disturb 
the legislature's judgment in the exercise of the general 
police powers as long as it does not violate constitutional 
limits. Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 355, 145 P. 
1047, 1048-49 (1915). The police powers are not, however7 
beyond the limitations established by the constitution. 
Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 125-26, 292 P. 194, 202 
(1930). 
The emphasis the State places on the police powers is 
often made when there is a close issue that turns on the 
difference between a taking or damage under article I, 
section 22 and mere regulation of property and activities on 
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property. Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a 
property owner can do with and on the owner's property. Those 
regulations may have a significant impact on the utility or 
value of property, yet they generally do not require 
compensation under article I, section 22. Only when 
governmental action rises to the level of a taking or damage 
under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay 
compensation. 
Previous cases of this Court have wrestled with the 
issue. In Bountiful Citv v, De Luca, the Court stated: 
Broad and comprehensive as are the 
police powers of the state, still we think 
it mav not successfully be contended that 
the power mav be so exercised as to 
infringe upon or invade rights safeguarded 
and guaranteed by constitutional 
provisions. . . . The cases are numerous 
to the effect that . . . the state may 
without compensation regulate and restrain 
the use of private property when the 
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the 
public requires or demands it; . . . that 
the exercise of proper police regulations 
may to some extent prevent enjoyment of 
individual rights in property or cause 
inconvenience or loss to the owner, does 
not necessarily render the police law 
unconstitutional, for the reason that such 
laws are not considered as appropriating 
private property for a public use, but 
simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, 
and if the owner through a lawful exercise 
of the power suffers inconvenience, injury, 
or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque 
injuria, provided always, that 
constitutional mandates have not been 
invaded by 9 confiscgtion, destruction, or 
deprivation of property, unless it is per 
se injurious or obnoxious or a menace to 
public health or public safety or morals or 
general welfare, or unless under conditions 
similar to tearing down a building to 
prevent spreading of a conflagration; but 
however broad the scope of the police 
power, it is always subject to the rule 
that the Legislature may not exercise any 
power expressly or impliedly forbidden by 
constitutional provisions. 
77 Utah at 119-121, 292 P.2d at 199-200 (emphasis added). In 
Salt Lake Citv v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 362, 145 P. 1047, 1051 
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(1915), we held that Ma landowner cannot complain because he is 
inconvenienced in the use of his property, where such 
inconvenience arises out of the proper enforcement of the 
police power to protect the public health, and where such 
enforcement does not amount to a taking or destruction of his 
property," 
Here, Colman argues that the State's actions were not 
a mere regulation of property, but constituted an actual 
physical taking. It is not relevant that the State's action in 
this case was a valid exercise of its police power. Rather, 
the issue is whether sufficient facts were alleged to show a 
taking of property. 
It is not alleged that Colman was causing a nuisance 
on the property. Thus, the case does not fall into the 
exception for the abatement of nuisances. 
D. Does the State avoid liability because its action was in 
response to an emergency? 
The State argues that no liability should be imposed 
on it because the breach destroyed the canal to avert an 
overwhelming destruction of property. Colman argues, however, 
that that principle only applies when the plaintiff's property 
would have been destroyed by the emergency condition 
irrespective of the governmental action. 
Colman correctly states that many of the cases involve 
situations where the plaintiff's property would have been 
destroyed by the emergency even if there had been no 
governmental action,. See United States v. Caltex 
(Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Sanauinetti v. United 
States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924). Colman argues that the 
"emergency" created by the higher lake waters did not affect 
the operation of the canal. However, the trial court must 
determine whether Colman's canal would have been in danger 
without the breach. 
Other cases dealing with emergencies and eminent 
domain can be distinguished because they involve questions of 
proper regulation and the use of the police power as discussed 
above. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Teresi v. 
State, 180 Cal. App. 3d 239, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1986). These 
cases do not involve a direct physical taking, as is alleged in 
this "case. 
However, all of the cases dealing with this emergency 
doctrine cannot be distinguished on these bases. The State 
argues correctly that in some cases there is no liability where 
property is destroyed by a governmental entity to prevent 
imminent public catastrophe. The privilege to take or damage 
private property without compensation arises from the necessity 
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of sacrificing some property to prevent overwhelming damage or 
loss of life. This privilege is based on the privilege of any 
individual to take immediate action that harms property so as 
to prevent loss of life or great destruction of property. City 
of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978). This 
exception to the general requirement of just compensation for 
property taken is explained in 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§§ 1.43[1] and 1.43[2]: 
More closely allied to the power of 
eminent domain is the power of destruction 
from necessity. In the case of fire, 
flood, pestilence or other great public 
calamity, when immediate action is 
necessary to save human life or to avert an 
overwhelming destruction of property, any 
individual may lawfully enter another's 
land and destroy his property, real or 
personal, providing he acts with reasonable 
judgment. 
If the individual who enters and 
destroys private property happens to be a 
public officer whose duty it is to avert an 
impending calamity, the rights of the owner 
of the property to compensation are no 
greater than in the case of a private 
individual. The most familiar example of 
the exercise of this right is seen in case 
of fire. ..The neighbors and fireman freely 
trespass on the adjoining land, and houses 
are even blown up to prevent the spread of 
the conflagration. The danger of flood or 
the existence of a pestilence may call for 
equally drastic action. However, the 
permanent appropriation of private property 
without the payment of compensation 
therefor cannot be justified under the 
power. 
1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 1.43[1], 1.43[2], at 1-841 to 
843 (3d ed. 1989) (footnotes omitted). This exception only 
applies where there is an extreme, imperative, or overwhelming 
necessity. Mere expediency is insufficient. Boland"271" 
N.W.2d at 66. There must be "circumstances of imminent 
necessity." Srb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 43 Colo. App. 14, 
18, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979), cert, denied as improvidentlv 
granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). This exception 
must be narrowly construed. Almost every act of taking 
property under the eminent domain powers involves some degree 
of public necessity. This exception could overcome the rule of 
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just compensation if it is not limited to lonly the most extreme 
emergencies. In McKell v. Spanish Fork Citv, 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 
P.2d 1097 (1957), this Court outlined howja governmental entity 
or any riparian owner could protect itself against 
extraordinary floods without liability: 
However, it is generally recognised that 
riparian owners may embank and protect 
their lands against the overflow of 
extraordinary floods, even though damage to 
the lands of others is caused thereby. An 
extraordinary flood is one which is not 
foreshadowed by the usual course of nature, 
and is of such a magnitude and 
destructiveness as could not havfe been 
anticipated or provided against py the 
exercise of ordinary foresight. 
McRell. 6 Utah 2d at 95-96, 305 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis in 
original). McKell involved an extraordinary flood. Here, it 
is a question of fact whether the rising water level 
constituted an "extraordinary flood*' and whether there were 
otherwise circumstances of overwhelming necessity. These 
questions cannot be decided on the basis (of the pleadings and 
will have to be decided at trial. 
Also involved in this case is the State's role in 
creating the emergency. Colman alleged that Southern Pacific 
is the owner of a right-of-way granted by the State over the 
bed of the lake for the construction of the causeway. It 
appears that the State played some role in the construction of 
the causeway, and the causeway seems to be the major factor in 
causing the "emergency" the State is now claiming. It is more 
difficult to find an emergency of overwhelming necessity when 
the State played a part in creating the circumstances causing 
the emergency. See McKell, 6 Utah 2d at|96-97, 305 P.2d at 
1099-1100. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain makes!clear that the 
permanent appropriation of property without compensation does 
not fit into this exception. 1 Nichols <bn Eminent Domain 
§ 1.43[2], at 1-843 (3d ed. 1989); see sftort v. Pierce County, 
194 Wash. 421, 435-36, 78 P.2d 610, 616 (1938).In this case, 
Colman alleges a permanent, taking of his|property. This is 
another question^ of_f_a_ct for the trial cburt to determine. 
On remand, the trial court must' determine whether the 
emergency exception applies in this instance. To fall within 
this exception, the trial court must find that the flooding 
created a situation of extreme, imperati 
necessity. In addition, the exception i 
State played a foreseeable role in causi 
ve, or overwhelming 
s not applicable if the 
ng the emergency. 
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IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Colman's complaint states a cause of action for 
inverse condemnation of his property. Colman alleged that the 
destruction of his canal constitutes a taking of his property 
without just compensation in violation of article I, section 22 
of the Utah Constitution. The State and Southern Pacific claim 
that they are immune from this inverse condemnation claim under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 
to -38. (1989).1 The issue is whether an inverse 
condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to 
the limitations found in the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This Court has struggled since the turn of the century 
to reconcile the doctrine of sovereign immunity with article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides simply that 
M[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation." Early and recent cases provide 
valuable insight into the meaning of this provision. 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1895 
spent a great deal of time formulating and debating the 
language of article I, section 22. The debates show that the 
delegates believed that the provision limited state government 
and was not merely advice that the legislature could choose to 
follow if it wished. See Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, 326-344, 623-53 (1898). The 
specific issue of the relation between sovereign immunity and 
article I, section 22 never arose in these debates. However, 
the more general issue of the role of the constitution in 
relation to the role of legislature was frequently discussed 
during the debates on article I, section 22. Throughout these 
discussions, the delegates assumed that article I, section 22 
would be a limitation on the state and that further legislation 
would provide no less protection than that mandated by 
article I, section 22. Proceedings and Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention, 625, 629-33 (1898) (indicating that 
the delegates saw the constitutional provision as the minimum 
1. In 1987, the legislatures waived its asserted immunity by 
adding § 63-30-10.5 to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
1987 Utah Laws ch. 75, § 3. That section provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for the 
recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental 
entity has taken or damaged private 
property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be 
assessed according to the requirements of 
Chapter 34, Title 78. 
However, this provision was not in place at the time this cause 
of action arose and does not apply here. 
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expected of the state and the legislature). The framers of the 
Utah Constitution expected it to act as a real limit on the 
powers of the state. The framers certainly did not intend to 
allow state government to override the constitutional guarantee 
with a legislative enactment. 
This Court originally held that article I, section 22 
was self-executing. Webber v. Salt Lake Citv, 40 Utah 221, 
224, 120 P. 503, 504 (1911). Later, the Court switched to a 
position that the state was immune from suit for damages under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that article I, 
section 22 was not self-executing. Fairclough v. Salt Lake 
County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). We now reaffirm 
that article I, section 22 is self-executing. In doing so, 
clarity requires that we specify the cases that the Court 
overrules. 
The question of whether article I, section 22 is 
self-executing involves the issue of whether the constitutional 
provision requires a legislative enactment to be enforced in 
the courts. As the law developed in this state, the question 
of whether article I, section 22 is self-executing gave rise to 
the specific issue of whether the legislature can block 
enforcement of article I, section 22 against the state or its 
political subdivisions by a grant of immunity. 
In Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 
201, 77 P. 849 (1904), the Court stated that "a party whose 
property is about to be specially damaged in any substantial 
degree for public use has the same rights and is given the same 
remedies for the protection of his property from the threatened 
injury as would be accorded him if his property was actually 
taken and appropriated for such use." 28 Utah at 213, 77 P. at 
853. See State ex rel. State Road Comm'n v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 393, 78 P.2d 502, 506 
(1937). In Stockdale. the Court referred to the discussions in 
the Constitutional Convention to support that proposition. 28 
Utah at 213, 77 P. at 853. Nevertheless, the Court later 
ignored the principle-that "takings* and-"damages" should be 
afforded the same remedies. 
In Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 
(1911), the Court explicitly held that article I, section 22 
was self-executing and the right to recover consequential 
damages for damage to property did not rely on legislative 
enactment. 40 Utah_at„224, 120 P. at 504; see Coalter v. Salt 
Lake City,- 40^ Utah_293,_298_ 12CL_P^_a51_853_X-19JL2) 
("Consequential damages to property which are caused by making 
public improvements are recoverable under the Constitution of 
this state, and not by virtue of a statute."). 
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913), 
did not deal with article I, section 22, but it seems to have 
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led to confusion in subsequent decisions dealing with sovereign 
immunity in the context of that provision. See Fairclouqh v. 
Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 425, 354 P.2d 105, 110-11 
(1960) (Wade, J., dissenting). In Wilkinson, the plaintiff 
sought recovery from a state fund for damage to his property 
caused by flooding from a canal the state had constructed. The 
Court stated that without the consent of the state an action 
against the sovereign could not be maintained: "We have 
neither a statute nor a constitutional provision authorizing a 
suit against the state." 42 Utah at 492, 134 P. at 630. 
Eight years later, the Court again stated that 
article I, section 22 was binding on the state as sovereign. 
In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District No. 1, 59 Utah 
121, 202 P. 539 (1921), the Court stated: 
Even the state itself, when acting 
within the scope of its sovereign powers, 
cannot take or damage private property for 
public use without making just and adequate 
compensation to the person to whom the 
property belongs. 
This is a fundamental law of the 
commonwealth, binding upon every department 
of the state government. It is the duty of 
the courts to give it full force and effect 
whenever it is properly invoked by one 
claiming its protection, even as against 
the sovereign power of the state. 
59 Utah at 126, 202 P. at 541 (emphasis added). 
Campbell Building Co, v. State Road Commission, 95 
Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), was like Wilkinson in holding 
that an action could not be maintained against the state 
without its consent. It was also like Wilkinson in that it did 
not deal with article I, section 22. 
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937), held 
that the individual commissioners of the State Road Commission 
could be enjoined from pursuing a highway project until 
payments for consequential damage were made to property 
owners. Because this action was-brought before the-improvement 
was constructed," the property "owners' sought" an injunction—not 
damages. Because of this, the Court did not consider in depth 
the relation of sovereign immunity to article I, section 22. 
The Court simply stated that the state could not be sued 
without its consent and cited Wilkinson and Campbell as 
authority. 94 Utah at 389, 78 P.2d at 504. As mentioned 
above, neither of those cases dealt with sovereign immunity in 
the context of an article I, section 22 claim. 
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The Court did state, however, that "it is clear that 
the framers of the Constitution did not intend to give the 
rights granted by section 22, and then leave the citizen 
powerless to enforce such rights." 94 Utah at 397, 78 P.2d at 
508- The Court then stated in dicta that if an injunction 
would not adequately protect the constitutional right, then the 
state could be found to have consented to suit against itself 
under article I, section 22. 94 Utah at 399, 78 P.2d at 509. 
Nevertheless, this and other similar dicta were soon 
ignored in the later cases. Anderson Investment Corp. v. 
State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972); Hiorth v. 
Whittenburq, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). In Hiorth, the 
Court held that the road commissioners individually could not 
be sued for consequential damages done to property in regrading 
for a highway project. 121 Utah at 330, 241 P.2d at 909. 
Chief Justice Wolfe concurred and stated that Hiorth overruled 
State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth 
Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937). Hiorth, 
121 Utah at 331, 241 P.2d at 910. 
In Sprinaville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 
349 P.2d 157 (1960), the plaintiff tried to circumvent N 
sovereign immunity and the holding in Hiorth by seeking a writ 
of mandamus to compel the members of the State Road Commission 
to initiate eminent domain proceedings to assess consequential 
damages to the plaintiff's property. The Court held that 
sovereign immunity could not be circumvented in that way. 
Sprinaville Banking, 10 Utah 2d at 103, 349 P.2d at 159. 
In Fairclouah v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 
P.2d 105 (1960), we held that "Art. I, Sec. 22 of our 
Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it give consent to 
be sued, implied or otherwise; and that to secure such consent 
is a legislative matter . . . ." 10 Utah 2d at 419, 354 P.2d 
at 106 (footnotes omitted). Fairclough was followed in State 
ex rel. Road Commission v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 
(1962), and in Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 
4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973). 
In Hampton v. State ex rel. Road Commission, 21 Utah 
2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), the Court took a less restrictive 
position on the issue of compensation from the state. In 
Hampton, the plaintiffs' right of access to their property was 
interfered with by the construction ;of Interstate 15. The 
Court held that the state had given its~consent~to be~ sued for 
the taking of property under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-9 (1953). 
The Court held that if the action of the state amounted to a 
"substantial and material impairment of access to their 
property," then it constituted a taking requiring compensation 
from the state. 21 Utah 2d at 348, 445 P.2d at 712. Thus, the 
Court made it possible for the plaintiff to recover by 
classifying the plaintiffs' damages as a taking, for which 
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immunity had been waived by statute, rather than as damage, for 
which the plaintiff could not recover under Fairclouah. 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), held the 
state liable because the state's conduct, which led to the 
damages sustained by the plaintiffs, fell within the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann, § 63-30-9 (1953), 
although Judge Bullock, sitting pro tempore, dissented and 
argued that article I, section 22 was self-executing and should 
be applied- 541 P.2d at 1122 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting). In 
dissent in separate cases, Justice Wade and Judge Bullock both 
cited many cases from other states holding that similar state 
constitutional provisions are self-executing. See Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d at 1123 n.6 (Bullock, D.J., dissenting); 
Sprinaville Banking Co, v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d at 105-09, 349 
P.2d at 159-62 (Wade, J., dissenting). Today the overwhelming 
majority of states with similar constitutional provisions hold 
them to be self-executing.2 
The history of these cases shows that for a time the 
Court's concentration on the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
caused it to neglect this constitutional provision, which was 
2. The following states hold their constitutional provisions 
requiring just compensation for taking or damaging private 
property to be self-executing or otherwise binding on the 
state. 
ALABAMA. Ala. Const, art. I, § 23 (M[B]ut private property 
shall not be taken for, or applied to public use, unless just 
compensation be first made therefor . . . • " ) ; City of Fairhope 
v. Raddcliffe, 48 Ala. App. 224, 229, 263 So. 2d 682, 686 
(1972) (authority to sue for damage caused by negligent 
construction of sewer system arises from Alabama constitution, 
not from statutory waiver of sovereign immunity). 
ALASKA. Alaska Const, art. I, § 18 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation."); State, Dept. of Highways v. Crosbv, 410 P.2d 
724, 728-29 (Alaska 1966) (basis of action was article I, 
section 18 of the Alaska constitution). 
ARIZONA. Ariz. Const, art. II, § 17 ("No private property 
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without 
just compensation having first been made . . . . • " ) ; Pima County 
v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 370, 351 P.2d 647, 649 (1960) ("This 
Court has previously held section 17, article 2, of the Arizona 
Constitution to be self-executing (County of'Mohave" v. 
Chamberlin, 78 Afiz7 422, 28T7P72d 17877 and i"t Ts "perf ectTy 
clear that the absence of enabling legislation cannot deprive 
plaintiff of his constitutional right to just compensation for 
any of his private property which is 'taken or damaged1 by the 
County.w). 
CALIFORNIA. Cal. Const, art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be 
taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation, 
ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or 
(continued on p. 17) 
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designed to protect individual rights. This elevation of 
legislation and common law principles over a clear 
constitutional limitation strikes at the heart of constitutional 
(footnote 2 continued) 
into court for, the owner.M); Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co. 
v. Citv of Burbank, 86 Cal. App. 3d 5, 9, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906, 
909 (1978) ("[Article I, section 19] requires no statutory 
implementation, since it is self-executing."); Rose v. State. 
19 Cal. 2d 713, 726, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (1942) ("Immunity from 
suit cannot avail in this instance, and, if no statute exists, 
liability still exists, because as to this provision the 
Constitutions are self-executing.") (quoting Chick Springs 
Water Co. v. State Hwv. Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 
(1931)). 
COLORADO. Colo. Const, art. II, § 15 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without 
just compensation."); Srb v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 43 
Colo App. 14, 19, 601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (the just 
compensation clause of the Colorado constitution creates an 
exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity), cert, 
denied as improvidentlv granted, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 
(1980). 
GEORGIA. Ga. Const, art. I, § 3, 1f 1 ("[Pjrivate property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without just 
and adequate compensation being first paid."); Fulton County v. 
Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 838, 242 S*E.2d 617, 619 (1978) (action 
for damage done to private property by county not barred by 
statute granting counties immunity from liability). 
ILLINOIS. 111. Const, art. I, § 15 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation as provided by law."); People ex rel. Alexander v. 
Citv of Mount Vernon, 404 111. 58, 66, 88 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1949) 
("The provision of the constitution guaranteeing compensation 
if property is taken or damaged for public use is 
self-executing, requires no legislation for its enforcement, 
and cannot be impaired by. legislation, or ordinance."). 
KENTUCKY. Ky. Const. § 13 ("[N]or shall any man's property be 
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his 
representatives and without just compensation being previously 
made to him."); Hollowav Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 248 
(Ky. 1984) (state waives immunity for suits under takings 
clause); Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Commonwealth. 295 Ky. 21, 25, 
172 S.W.2d 661, 663 (1943) (the constitutional provisions 
"support the rule th_at„ ._._.__ where a\ trespass . _ . .amounts to 
[a] taking, the state's immunity from suit is waived . . . " ) . 
LOUISIANA. La. Const, art. I, § 4 ("Property shall not be 
taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions 
except for public purposes and with just compensation 
• • • • " ) ; Revmond v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Highways, 255 La. 
425, 447, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (1970) (constitutional provision 
supports suit for inverse condemnation by property owner); 
Anoelle v. State. 212 La. 1069, 1076, 34 So. 2d 321, 323 (1948) 
(continued on p. 18) 
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government. The people of Utah established the Utah 
Constitution as a limitation on the power of government. It 
(footnote 2 continued) 
("This provision, which is similar to that appearing in other 
State Constitutions, has been generally regarded as 
self-executing."). 
MINNESOTA. Minn. Const, art. I, § 13 ("Private property shall 
not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just 
compensation therefor, first paid or secured."); State v. 
Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969) (property 
owner is entitled to damages for constitutional taking). 
MISSISSIPPI. Miss. Const, art. Ill, § 17 ("Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due 
compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof 
. . . . " ) ; State Highway Comm'n v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 593, 4 
So. 2d 345, 349 (1941) ("It would be a mockery Eor the 
Constitution to guarantee a right to the property owner, and a 
duty on the taker thereof, and leave the enforcement of both 
dependent upon the legislative will."). 
MISSOURI. Mo. Const, art. I, § 26 ([P]rivate property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation."); Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 
377 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo. 1964) ("While the state cannot be sued 
without its consent, and there is no statutory provision 
authorizing such suits, nevertheless, 'if the injury alleged is 
a damage within the constitutional provision, that provision is 
self-enforcing.'") (quoting Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & 
Levee Dist., 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448, 455 (1925)). 
MONTANA. Mont. Const, art. II, § 29 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation to the full extent of the loss . . . . " ) ; City of 
Three Forks v. State Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 398, 480 
P.2d 826, 830 (1971) (the constitutional provision prohibiting 
the taking or damaging of private property without just 
compensation waives the immunity of the state where that 
provision applies). 
NEBRASKA. Neb. Const, art. I, § 21 ("The property of no person 
shall be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation therefor,"); Kula v. Prososki, 219 Neb. 626, 629, 
365 N.W.2d 441, 443 (1985) ("[Article I, section 21] of the 
Constitution is self-executing, and legislative action is not 
necessary to make the remedy available."). 
NEW MEXICO. N.M. Const, art. II, § 20 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for~ public use without :iust 
compensation."); McClure'v. Town~of~Mesilla"r 93 N7M~ 4477 448, 
601 P.2d 80, 81 (Ct. App. 1979) (citing Summerford v. Board of 
Commr's of Dona Ana County, 35 N.M. 374, 379, 298 P. 410, 413 
(1931) (plaintiff property owner could base suit on article II, 
section 20)). 
NORTH DAKOTA. N.D. Const, art. I, § 16 ("Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation . . . . " ) ; Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. 
(continued on p. 19) 
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can hardly be maintained that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, alone among all doctrines, is oiktside of the 
1968) ("We have 
[son's property shall 
lied to public use 
. " ) ; San Antonio 
449 (Tex. 1962) ("The 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Citv of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d 355, 358 (NiD, 
held on numerous occasions that under this constitutional 
provision the owner may maintain an action to recover damages 
for the taking of his property and for consequential damages to 
his property resulting from a public use.r). 
SOUTH DAKOTA. S.D. Const, art. VI, § 13 ^"Private property 
shall not be taken for public use, or damaged, without just 
compensation . . . . " ) ; Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 170, 143 
N.W.2d 722, 729 (1966) ("In the absence ojf an adequate remedy 
provided by the legislature which condemnees may invoke in such 
cases, Section 13, Article VI of our Constitution is deemed to 
be self-executing granting them a right o|f trial by jury in the 
circuit courts of our state."). 
TEXAS. Tex. Const, art. I, § 17 ("No perk 
be taken, damaged or destroyed for or appi 
without adequate compensation being made , 
River Authority v. Lewis, 363 S.W.2d 444, 
provisions of Section 17, Article I of the Constitution of 
Texas applies as well to the State and its agencies as to 
private corporations."). I 
VIRGINIA. Va. Const, art. I, § 11 ("[N]dr any law whereby 
private property shall be taken or damaged for public uses, 
without just compensation • . . . " ) ; Heldt v. Elizabeth River 
Tunnel Dist.. 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1954) ("It 
is well settled that such a constitutional provision is 
self-executing and the landowner may enforce his constitutional 
right to compensation in a common-law action."). 
WASHINGTON. Wash. Const, art. I, § 16 ('JNo private property 
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without 
just compensation having been first made . . . . " ) ; Kincaid v. 
Citv of Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 621, 134 P. 504, 506 (1913) 
("The city is bound to make compensation J under a compact no 
less formal than.the_constitution itself\ and it cannot defeat 
this constitutional right by a charter provision or an 
ordinance, nor can the legislature take it away by any 
arbitrary requirement . . . . " ) . [ 
WEST VIRGINIA. W. Va. Const, art. Ill, § 9 ("Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public[use, without just 
compensation . . . . " ) ; Johnson v. City 6f Parkersburg, 16 W. 
Va. 402, 422-23 (1880) ("I have nowhere keen it contended that 
the clause of a Constitution, which,declares, that 'private 
property shall not be taken for public" use without "just 
compensation,' requires legislation to p[it it in force. It has 
always been regarded as self executing.
 ( It is a limitation, 
pnd corporations, but 
The court proceeds 
not only upon the rights of individuals 
also upon the Legislatures of the States!, 
to hold that the result is the same if the constitutional 
provision covers damages as well.). 
WYOMING. Wyo. Const, art. I, § 33 ("Private property shall not 
(continued on p. 20) 
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limitations the people established. In Dean v. Rampton, 556 
P.2d 205 (Utah 1976), we stated: 
The purpose of a constitution is to provide 
an orderly foundation for government and to 
keep even the sovereign . . . within its 
bounds. Therefore, the legislative power 
itself must be exercised within the 
framework of the constitution. 
Accordingly, it has been so long 
established and universally recognized, as 
to be hardly necessary to state, that if a 
statutory enactment contravenes any 
provision of the constitution, the latter 
governs. 
556 P.2d at 206-07 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 
L. Ed. 60 (1803)) . 
(footnote 2 continued) 
be taken or damaged for public or private use without just 
compensation."); State Highway Comm'n v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 
395 (Wyo. 1966) ("However, the legislature cannot infringe upon 
or take from property owners the right to be compensated, 
according to the requirement of art. I, § 33."). 
The law in three states differs from the positions of 
these courts. 
ARKANSAS. Ark. Const, art. II, § 22 ("[A]nd private property 
shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, 
without just compensation therefor.") (law on this issue is 
unclear). 
OKLAHOMA. Okla. Const, art. II, § 24 ("Private property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation."); State ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Hoebel, 
594 P.2d 1213, 1214-15 (Okla. 1979) (under the Oklahoma 
constitution, a claim in inverse condemnation for a taking for 
a public use is not subject to sovereign immunity, but a claim 
for damages is). 
PENNSYLVANIA. Pa. Const, art. I, § 10 ("[N]or shall private 
property be taken or applied to public use, without authority 
of law and without just compensation being first made or 
secured."). The law on this issue is not clear in 
Pennsylvania, but a recent case indicates that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would' hold-it"ttr~be~self -^executing . --Hucrhes -v: 
Commonwealth Dep't. of TransPTT 514 Pa— 300 r 306 r~523 A.2d 747, 
750 (1987) ("What is 'just compensation1 cannot be determined 
by the exclusive fiat of the General Assembly, for like all 
others they cannot be the judge in their own case. The 
determination of what is 'just' between the Commonwealth and a 
condemnee is the function of the judiciary."). 
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In sum, article I, section 22 nefeds no legislation to 
activate it; it is mandatory and obligatory as it is. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 24. 
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted 
as the State's contractor on the causeway breach project and 
was therefore protected by the State's immunity. Since we hold 
that the State is not immune, Southern Pal 
depend on the State's immunity. We express no opinion as to 
Southern Pacific's argument of derivative 
status as the State's contractor for the 
cific can no longer 
immunity based on its 
project. 
V. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The trial court held that the breaching of the 
causeway was in furtherance of the Statejs public trust 
responsibilities and that the State could not be liable for the 
damage allegedly done to Colman's canal. The State maintains 
that it can take any action relating to the lake that is in the 
public interest and be immune from liability for that action. 
Colman argues that the public trust doctrine does not apply to 
flood control, but only to certain limited purposes, such as 
commerce, fishing, navigation, and perhaps recreational use and 
preservation of ecological integrity. 
The controlling case on this issue is Illinois Central 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), where the United 
States Supreme Court discussed the public trust doctrine and 
held that the Illinois legislature's earjLier grant to the 
railroad of lands submerged under Lake Michigan could be 
revoked by a later legislature because tne earlier grant was in 
violation of the public trust the state held over the waters. 
The essence of this doctrine is that navigable waters 
should not be given without restriction Ito private parties and 
should be preserved for the general public for uses such as 
commerce, navigation, and fishing. Recent cases have examined 
this doctrine in deciding whether the stjate could grant uses of 
public waters to private parties. See, b.a., Kootenai Envtl. 
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, [inc., 105 Idaho 622, 
671 P.2d 1085 (1983). 
This case, however, presents a 
State has already exercised its powers under the public trust 
different problem. The 
ake" to" Colman. - Now; 
thout"compensation tc 
do so since it holds 
in leasing the canal on the bed of the 1< 
the State wishes to revoke" that grant~'wii 
Colman. The State maintains that it can 
the waters of the lake under the public (trust. In taking such 
a position, the State essentially argued that it originally 
acted without authority in granting the lease to Colman. 
Illinois Central provides some guidance on this 
question. The Supreme Court stated: 
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But the decisions are numerous which 
declared that such property is held by the 
State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in 
trust for the public. The ownership of the 
navigable waters of the harbor and of the 
lands under them is a subject of public 
concern to the whole people of the State. 
The trust with which they are held, 
therefore, is governmental and cannot be 
alienated, except in those instances 
mentioned of parcels used in the 
improvement of the interest thus held, or 
when parcels can be disposed of without 
detriment to the public interest in the 
lands and waters remaining. 
146 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made 
clear that a state can grant certain rights in navigable waters 
if those rights can be disposed of without affecting the public 
interest in what remains. 146 U.S. at 453. At this point in 
the litigation, there is nothing to show that Colman's canal 
impaired the public interest in any way at the time the State 
granted him the right to conduct his operation. This is a 
question of fact to be decided by the trial court. 
VI. SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Colman argues on appeal that the Great Salt Lake 
Causeway Act (the "Act") was beyond legislative authority and 
constituted special legislation in violation of article VI, 
section 26 of the Utah Constitution. Article VI, section 26 
provides, "No private or special law shall be enacted where a 
general law can be applicable." In this case, the Act provided 
indemnity to Southern Pacific for actions arising out of the 
breach of the causeway. 
The fact that legislation benefited one individual 
does not prove a violation of article VI, section 26. Hulbert 
v. State, 607 P.2d--1217^ 1223 . (Utah -1980) . - The standards for-
judging challenged legislation under this provision were stated 
by this Court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah 
Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977): 
A general law applies to and operates 
uniformly upon all members of any class of 
persons, places, or things requiring, 
legislation peculiar_to_thems-elv.es in_the. 
matters covered by the laws in question. 
On the other hand, special legislation 
relates either to particular persons, 
places, or things or to persons, places or 
things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by any method of selection 
from the whole class to which the law 
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might/ but for such legislation, be 
applied. 
. . . [A] law is general when it 
applies egually to all persons embraced in 
a class founded upon some natural/ I 
intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. 
It is special legislation if it confers 
particular privileges or imposes peculiar 
disabilities/ or burdensome conditions in 
the exercise of a common right; upon a 
class of persons arbitrarily selected, from 
the general body of those who stand in 
precisely the same relation to the subject 
of the law. The constitutional prohibition 
of special legislation does not preclude 
legislative classification, but only 
requires the classification to be 
reasonable. 
564 P.2d at 754 (following State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 505, 
94 P.2d 414, 420 (1939); People v. Western fruit Growers, Inc., 
22 Cal. 2d 494, 506/ 140 P.2d 13/ 19-20 (1943)). 
In the Act, the legislature found that extreme weather 
conditions had caused the water level in thp lake to rise 
sharply, causing severe flood damage. 1984 Utah Laws ch. 32, 
§ 1. It also found that the causeway had claused the water 
level in the south arm of the lake to be significantly higher 
than the water level in the north arm. Th^ legislature 
declared it to be in the public interest to breach the causeway 
and authorized the Division of State Lands and Forestry to do 
so. The legislature then stated: MIn ord^r to obtain the 
cooperation of the Southern Pacific Railroad which is necessary 
for the timely accomplishment of the objectives of this act, 
the division is authorized to enter into formal agreement with 
the railroad for indemnification as follow^ . . . ." 1984 Utah 
Laws ch. 32, § 2. 
This legislation makes a reasonable classification to 
accomplish its purposes of preventing widespread flood damage 
to public lands, major transportation routes, and other public 
facilities. Southern Pacific owns the causeway. This statute 
does not discriminate against anyone since Southern Pacific is 
the owner of the causeway and the operator of the railway that 
crosses the causeway.- The Act-is-not speqial legislation.in 
violation of article—VI-,- section-26. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint 
is reversed, and the case is remanded to iphe trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
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WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Associate 
Chief Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring) 
I join in all of Justice Stewart's opinion. However, 
as to part IIIB, which holds that the allegations of Colman's 
complaint are sufficient to state a claim for a taking or 
damaging under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
I would observe that the precise limits of a taking or damaging 
have yet to be carefully or consistently spelled out by this 
court. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). There will be time enough for us to 
carefully consider this question in future cases. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Zimmerman. 
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